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English

THE ENLIGHTENMENT: JOHN MESSLIER

Today many exceptions seem obvious relevant to the historic
advance of secularism from the Renaissance to the Reformation
followed by the Enlightenment. However, a basic transition seems to
have sustained itself over many decades in the modern recovery of
religious disbelief ultimately derivative of pre-Socratic philosophy
consolidated by Aristotle. For example, the two years of 1610-1611
seem to have set the stage for all three of the later historic epochs, the
Renaissance followed by the Reformation and Enlightenment. The
King James translation of the Bible in 1611 might have been a major
achievement of the English Reformation just preceding Milton, but
Shakespeare's final play, “The Tempest,” produced the same year,
effectively brought the English Renaissance to a close as suggested by
its secular wording, "What's past is prologue," "Oh brave new world,"
and, most tellingly, "We are such stuff as dreams are made on, and
our little life is rounded with a sleep" as opposed to the promise of
heavenly infinitude. Similarly, Ben Jonson's stage satire “The
Alchemist,” first produced in 1610, invoked a level of skepticism that
both anticipated and exceeded the conventions of Restoration
comedy that followed.
On the other hand, two unfortunate young Englishmen,
Bartholomew Legate and Edward Wightman, were actually
burned at the stake in 1611 for espousing Unitarian views. Their
shared executions apparently terminated this medieval practice in
Great Britain, but in doing so they nevertheless exemplified the
most repulsive aspect of the Reformation obviously connected
with the Inquisition just a few centuries earlier. Not more than a
century later, a remarkable example of historic simultaneity
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occurred in the American colonies, when Jonathan Edwards and
Benjamin Franklin lived as contemporaries but with values and
opinions radically different from each other. With vigorous
righteousness, Edwards renewed the witchcraft trials of the
Reformation on American soil at roughly the same time as
Franklin promoted a variety of secular issues typical of the
Enlightenment—from democratic governance to the invention of
electricity. In effect Edwards primarily addressed religious
concerns in light of rigorous puritanism whereas Franklin featured
innovations expressive of a strictly secular perspective.
In France, Pyrrhonism and Academic skepticism, the two
principal modes of skepticism inspired by classical sources, more
or less took root as a clandestine secular tradition throughout the
seventeenth century, while a more confrontational hostility to
religion gathered momentum that culminated with the deist trend
in both England and France. It has been estimated that as many as
a hundred manuscripts were in circulation in France advocating
the deist cause as early as the turn of the eighteenth century. This
might have occurred as a two-decade lag compared to the deist
trend in England, but with essentially the same collective purpose
in opposition to Biblical authority. Catholicism continued to
prevail in France as promoted by experienced priests, but the
Bible’s textual validity apart from the role of the Church became a
serious matter for debate by French deists as well as sympathizers
in England. Spinoza initiated this task in continental Europe, and
England’s assortment of deists pursued the cause inspired by the
writings of Blount, Toland, and Collins. For if the Bible itself was
vulnerable to challenge based on its many contradictions and
inaccuracies, an entire millennium of scholastic philosophy could
also be rejected.
In effect a tectonic shift in collective ideology seems to have
occurred based a deist rejection of numerous orthodox Christian
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assumptions. As promised in his first book, Against the Academics,
St. Augustine had long since initiated scholastic philosophy as
much as anything to dispense with the secular transgressions of
classical philosophy that had yet to be eradicated except for Plato’s
doctrine. Similarly, Christianity itself could be challenged in later
centuries because of the fallibility of Biblical information beyond
minor textual adjustments. Just as Augustine’s scholarship had
played a substantial role in consolidating the collective rejection of
secular philosophy, the likelihood of flaws in the Bible encouraged
the resurrection of secular philosophy at odds with religious
demands. For if the Bible could be shown to have contained a
large variety of probable historical inaccuracies, many centuries of
scholastic effort rooted in Biblical assumptions could be dismissed
on a similar basis.
In effect the deist trend in France emerged as an
underground movement just a few years after its earlier
breakthrough in England. Within the second decade of the
eighteenth century, the anonymous text Le Militaire philosophe, ou
difficultés sur la religion, proposes au Malebranche, prêtre de l’Oratoire
was circulated to challenge the likelihood of Christ’s miracles as
well as transubstantiation, the Apocrypha, and various Christian
practices similar to those of pagan religion. As early as 1722, N.
Fréret published a Lettre de Thrasybule à Leucippe that also featured
the resemblance between Christianity and contemporary pagan
religions. Between 1722 and 1740, C. Dumarsais published Analyse
de la religion chrétienne to point out discrepancies between the Old
and New Testaments as well as rejecting the validity of various
miracles and prophecies attributed to Christ. At about the same
time, Lévesque de Burigny published Examen critique des apologists
de la religion chrétienne to explore in depth the divergent beliefs of
early Christian sects as well as a random assortment of miracles
and prophecies.1 All of these authors were deists in the sense that
they continued to accept the notion of a single all-powerful God,
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but most of them questioned the final validity of the Bible as well
as various aspects of Christian doctrine relevant to God’s final
authority. They did not go as far as Spinoza’s pantheism in
identifying God with the universe itself, but they did concur with
his critique of the Old Testament in his Treatise on Religion and
Political Philosophy, and they extended his skepticism to the New
Testament as well.
In his pivotal two-volume History of Freethought, published
in 1936, J.M. Robertson devoted eight pages of small print to list
all the French publications he could find relevant to freethought
inclusive of deism and atheism through the entire eighteenth
century.2 Aside from their contents, the numerical momentum of
the published texts that remain available today in the French
language suggests an obvious rise and fall of this remarkable
hundred-year trend:
1700-1709
1710-1719
1720-1729
1730-1739
1740-1749
1750-1759
1760-1769
1770-1779
1780-1789
1790-1799

5
5
3
11
13
25
44
25
15
7

The definitive pattern of growth and decline disclosed by these
numbers compiled by Robertson indicates modest activity during
the first three decades, a doubling during the next two decades
followed by an unprecedented and seemingly inexplicable surge
over the following three decades, and finally an obvious relapse to
earlier levels over the final two decades. Exactly why? As in the
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history of English deism that had already come to the fore at the
beginning of the century, at least a dozen secular publications by
French iconoclasts seem to have been in wide circulation during
this period. The trend would seem to have reached its peak by the
1760s, at least a decade and a half preceding the American
Revolution, and, significantly, all the major French secularists
during this period died at least half a decade preceding the 1789
French Revolution. In retrospect, the pivotal figure who seems to
have been the most responsible in having initiated this major
transitional phase was Jean Meslier, an obscure French priest who
only declared his radical atheistic stance upon his death.
JEAN MESLIER
As an otherwise inconspicuous Catholic village priest, Jean
Meslier (1664-1729?), effectively promoted an uncompromising
version of atheism based on the radical assumption that no God
whatsoever exists that exercises ultimate authority pertaining to
human destiny as well as the physical universe as a whole. Many
centuries earlier, classical Greek atheists had maintained this
stance on a similar basis as documented in my recently published
history, An Archaeology of Disbelief. Perhaps a half dozen Greek
philosophers shared this conviction, and during the Middle Ages
more than a thousand years later a large number of so-called
heretics were burned at the stake for their impiety in adhering to
comparable assumptions. Later, during the Renaissance, Spinoza’s
pantheism served as a major departure from Christian orthodoxy,
and such English figures as Thomas Kidd, Christopher Marlowe,
Sir Walter Raleigh, and the Earl of Rochester were also justifiably
suspected of atheism. These individuals seem to have freely
expressed their doubts at least in private conversations among
themselves and their friends, but there is no evidence of their
commitment to impiety in their published writings. A few such as
both Collins and Tindal among English deists even seem to have
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been willing to identify themselves as atheists now and again, if in
fact this disclosure a couple hundred years later is based on
hearsay evidence rather than published secular arguments.3
Meslier accordingly took a major step forward by having
introduced an entirely new and more credible secular perspective.
A generation younger than Bayle, he was outspoken in his
posthumous rejection of the God concept and entirely willing to
explain why despite his status as a provincial village priest who
had suppressed his opinion for his entire life. Upon his suicide, he
seems to have carefully left on his kitchen table three identical
copies of his elongated atheist text bearing the title, Testament:
Memoir of the Thoughts and Sentiments of Jean Meslier, all of them
having been composed in his meticulous handwriting. At least
one of them—and probably more--somehow escaped destruction,
unlike Tindal’s final text that was earlier destroyed by the Bishop
of London before it could be published. The destiny of Meslier’s
many arguments was more fortunate, especially since copies
sooner or later fell into the hands of Voltaire and the rest of the
philosophes linked with the French Enlightenment.
Meslier began his Testament by profusely apologizing to his
parishioners for his life-long hypocrisy as an atheist in the guise of
a Christian priest, and then he launched into a thorough rejection
of Christian orthodoxy mixed with his indignation against the
local aristocracy committed to Christian prerogatives. Contrary to
received opinion it was not Diderot but Meslier who first declared
the wish, “that all the rulers of the earth and all the nobles be
hanged and strangled with the guts of priests.”4 Today, his
pronouncements continue to be no less striking than at the
beginning of the eighteenth century. Unlike Bayle and most other
English deists, he took pains to make his ideas entirely clear, but
after his death. Of course his posthumous reputation would entail
both social disgrace and certain damnation if his secret atheistic
vision turned out to be wrong, but he accepted the risk, and in
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retrospect his choice seems to have been entirely justified in light
of modern scientific evidence. In any case, his friends were able to
bury his body quickly enough in an unmarked grave, his books
somehow escaped destruction, and his future destiny occurred as
predicted in his book’s final words:
I already take almost no part in what is done in the world.
The dead, whom I am about to join, no longer worry about
anything, they no longer take part in anything, and they no
longer care about anything. So, I will finish this with
nothing. I am hardly more than nothing and soon I will be
nothing.”5
And true enough, one suspects, except for the substantial impact
of his remarkable manuscript in future years.
Copies of Meslier’s text apparently circulated among an
expanding readership for three decades before Voltaire provided a
modified version of its argument within a simpler arrangement
without fully disclosing Meslier’s uncompromising commitment
to secular analysis as well as his own mounting indignation
against the oppressive role of the aristocracy seemingly justified
by orthodox religion. In 1761 Voltaire published a truncated
version roughly half the length of the original text with the
addition of the subtitle Extrait des Sentiments de Jean Meslier. In
retrospect he seems to have wanted to provide a reasoned deist
manifesto that formulated a secular stance more aggressive than
his own relatively moderate version. In any case, both versions of
Meslier’s text apparently benefitted from a wide circulation.
A decade later, in 1772, the most controversial atheist at the
time (who successfully kept his identity unknown throughout his
life), Baron d’Holbach, published Meslier’s entire manuscript in an
entirely new edition with the title Le Bons Sens. Moreover,
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D’Holbach fully restored and featured all atheistic passages but
excluded the social and political critique. In one format or another
the text seems to have circulated throughout later years, and in
1864, more or less a century afterwards, a complete but flawed 3volume version was published as Le Testament de Jean Meslier.
Only in the eighteen-seventies did a couple of accurate French
editions become available of the complete text first intended by
Meslier.6 And Anna Knoop finally translated Voltaire’s truncated
version into English in 1878, thus becoming Meslier’s received
standard edition among English and American freethinkers until
Michael Shreve’s “modern” translation of the complete original
text as late as 2009, published by Prometheus Books.
Along with major organizational differences, the thematic
and stylistic differences between Meslier’s full text and Voltaire’s
partial version are so distinct that the two can and ought to be
treated as essentially different books, both of them fully worth the
effort. Meslier had organized 97 chapters arbitrarily divided into
nine topic areas relevant to religion in general inclusive of
Christian doctrine and practices, whereas Voltaire’s version had
expanded the organization to 206 more or less aphoristic chapters
in somewhat random order. Meslier’s original version as
translated by Shreve featured elongated and somewhat repetitious
analysis laced with cautious indignation, whereas Voltaire’s
version translated by Knoop offered a more aphoristic response
steeped in aristocratic contempt. Also, many of Meslier’s
argumentative sentences seem to have been enlarged to almost a
couple paragraphs in length, as opposed to Voltaire’s sentences
which tended to be more aphoristic with a sophisticated and
relatively impatient audience in mind. Both authors were entirely
disdainful of religious orthodoxy, but Meslier’s stance can be
characterized as sustained argument vigorously rooted in outright
disbelief as opposed to Voltaire’s relentless scorn.
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It should be emphasized, however, that the most significant
difference between the two texts was that Meslier wrote as an
outspoken atheist whereas Voltaire carefully provided what could
be interpreted as a deistic revision of Meslier’s intended argument.
In Voltaire’s text as translated by Knoop, the Hebraic version of
God promoted by Christians was described as an evil authority
without disclosing the even more radical alternative intended by
Meslier that no God whatsoever exists. In effect, Voltaire quoted
Meslier to criticize the god concept held by “Christ cultists,” but
without conceding that no god at all existed in Meslier’s opinion.
By implication, if God could possess eternal existence, why not the
universe itself without God. Voltaire also mentioned the choice of
individuals driven to the verge of atheism by what seemed the
cruelty of an angry God:
The priests have made of God such a malicious, ferocious
being, so ready to be vexed, that there are few men in the
world who do not wish at the bottom of their hearts that this
God did not exist.7
Voltaire neglected to mention that this radical possibility had
already been taken into account by Meslier himself.
Meslier postponed his effort to make his atheism plain until
the inception of his third chapter at least in the Shreve translation,
with two previous chapters having served as long introductory
essays that provided a broad secular perspective as suggested by
the following passages:
Know, then, my friends, that everything that is spouted
and practiced in the world for the cult and adoration of gods
is nothing but errors, abuses, illusions, and impostures. All
the laws and orders that are issued in the name and
authority of God or the gods are really only human
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inventions, just as all the beautiful celebratory pageants and
sacrifices and divine services and all the other superstitious
practices of religion and devotion that are done in their
honor.
. . . And what I say here in general about the vanity and
falsity of the religions of the world, I do not say only about
the foreign and pagan religions, which you already regard as
false, but I say it also about your Christian religion because,
in fact, it is no less vain or less false than any other. I could
say, in a way, that it is even more vain and more false than
any other, because there is, perhaps, none so ridiculous or so
absurd in its principles and principal points than this one,
and none so opposed to Nature itself and good judgment.8
Arguably, Meslier was simplistic in his critique of religion as
having been the creation of “shrewd and crafty politicians” rather
than a collective practice of an entire population that is derivative
of tribal custom preceding early and modern civilization as later
confirmed by the numerous findings of modern anthropologists
and archaeologists beginning with Edward Tylor and Robert
Lowie. Then again, Meslier’s argument was quite specific relevant
to both ancient and modern civilization, when “crafty politicians”
had little difficulty putting “crude old culture” to work in support
of their seemingly justifiable leadership. Not surprisingly, Meslier
suggested that the pursuit of military conquest almost inevitably
depends on religion’s intensification to justify this collective
imposition.9 Also, he almost incidentally suggested that the most
warlike nations are too often the most religious.
In any case, Meslier was clearly an uncompromising atheist.
In Chapter 59 he insisted in italics, “That there is no God,” and he
repeated this categorical insistence in chapters 73, 74, 93, and 94.
His atheism was everywhere evident in his original text, whether
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declared or not, and it took exceptional talent on Voltaire’s part in
softening its analysis to suggest a somewhat conciliatory deist
rejection of orthodox religious beliefs and practices.
Meslier primarily justified his loose argument of Testament
by proposing eight atheistic “proofs” each of which demonstrates
that religion and Christianity in particular are in all respects
entirely susceptible to “errors, illusion, and imposture.” His first
proof served to concede that all religions have played justified
roles in their hostility to oppressive political authority. His second
proof thereupon questioned the excessive reliance on doctored
scriptures and religion’s similarity to pagan miracles. The third
proof similarly questioned the validity of visions, sacrifices, and
divine revelations typical of all religious belief. The fourth
featured the obvious inaccuracy of Old and New Testament
prophesies as well as the dependence on allegorical interpretation
to justify factual deficiencies. The fifth specifically examined
Christian concepts of original sin, the holy trinity, the incarnation
of God, the concept of transubstantiation, the paradoxical
existence of hell created by a presumably loving God, and the
excessive level of commitment emphasized in the character and
teachings of Christ. The sixth proof, obviously an extension of the
first, challenged the use of to ensure the secular authority of
royalty and the aristocracy. The seventh emphasized the falsity of
Christian ontology, and finally the eighth attacked the notion of an
immortal soul in light of an essentially Lockean version of human
psychology anticipated by Aristotle.
In his second proof, Meslier more specifically rejected the
validity of miracles by exploring in depth all the Old and New
Testament examples, then compared them to the almost countless
miracles featured by other religions to prove their own unique
authenticity, many of them having occurred preceding the New
Testament and even earlier than the Old Testament. The pagan
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miracles of different societies turned out to be very similar--if not
the same--raising the issue how so many different religions could
have obtained tangible verification of the singular authority of
their particular creeds. Meslier goes on to cite the ancient Jewish
historian Josephus to the effect that dependence on miracles
actually “depreciates” a belief and “makes it suspect,” as also
insisted much later by Gabriel Naudé, “. . . we do not have to
bother refuting them because they are self negating easily enough
by their own absurdities.”10 Later, Meslier uses Naudé’s quotation
of Agobard, the bishop of Lyon in 833 to the effect “that there is
now nothing too absurd or ridiculous for Christians to believe
more easily than the pagans ever did in their errors and
idolatries.”11 Meslier argues that this susceptibility also applies to
Christ’s miracles. Concluding-. . . Since it would be a very great stupidity to put faith now
in the so-called miracles of paganism, so likewise is it a very
great stupidity to put faith in those of Christianity, seeing
that they both come from the same principle of errors,
illusions, lies, and impostures.12
Paradoxically, as suggested by Josephus, the validity of a religion
might be judged by its dependence on stories of miracles and
divine intervention. The more excessive the needed credulity, the
greater the risk of fraud, and with Christianity obviously
vulnerable to this particular consideration.
In any case, it is the seventh proof—from chapter 59 to 86
(pp. 341-530)--that provides the core of Meslier’s philosophical
argument extending from his deterministic explanation of the
physical universe to his insistence on the pursuit of a secular ethics
presumably superior to the submissive obedience of “Christcultists” and “god-cultists” in general. As proposed by such
ancient philosophers as Melissus, Parmenides, and Aristotle in his
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later works upon cosmology, Meslier also insists that the physical
universe has existed forever without any beginning and therefore
without having been created by God: “. . . There is no more reason
to say that the world and everything in the world was created by
God than to say that they have always been of themselves and that
they were formed and arranged of themselves in the state they are
in, matter having been of itself for all eternity . . .”13 In other
words, if it is possible that God‘s manifestation can be infinite—
with no beginning, no end--why not the universe itself devoid of
its creation by God? And if nothing whatsoever has ever been
created ex nihilo on this basis, the need for a creator becomes
redundant, so the infinite god-concept in turn becomes no less
redundant at least to that extent.14 Meslier did not verbalize this
extra step, but his assumption encouraged such speculation, for
example by Nietzsche a hundred fifty years later.
The overall size of the universe, Meslier insisted, is no less
infinite than its duration. It lacks any kind of an outer edge
imposed by God on either a spatial or temporal basis. Moreover,
he argued, a spiritual God without physical extension is very
likely incapable of creating the infinite extension of the universe.
In other words, “What has no extension cannot have created
extension, which is necessarily infinite.”15 Once again the a priori
existence of an infinite universe in and of itself makes more sense
than the concept of a God who supposedly preceded this universe
and still exists in an eternal realm of His own beyond it. Simply
enough, if God can be infinite, why cannot the universe itself be
without a God. Moreover, the identity of such a God unavoidably
defies the truism that “what always remains the same, always
does the same.”16 If this is true, and if God exists, such an infinite
being has very likely created countless alternative cosmic realms
additional to the universe we inhabit. Moreover, if God’s role was
in having created the universe in its entirety, this presumed
authority becomes totally redundant if the universe has been
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eternal without having been created by any kind of God. For if
God can be eternal, why not the universe itself without any need
for God? All in all, Meslier, argued-Again to say that this being [God] is everywhere in its
immensity although it is found nowhere and to say,
nevertheless, that it has no parts that correspond to the
different parts of all this immense space that it contains, but
that it is all entire everywhere because of its immensity and
all entire in each part of this immense space because of the
simplicity and indivisibility of its nature--this is pushing the
absurdities over the line, it is saying and making things up
that are not only the most impossible but also the most
absurd and ridiculous that one could imagine.17
Also essential to Meslier’s materialist teleology was his insistence
that “being and matter are the same thing.” More specifically, he
argued, being (i.e. existence) is the “substantial” manifestation of
everything while the manner of being is the “formal” aspect of
everything. Today, his more or less Cartesian distinction seems
primitive compared to the principles of relativity and quantum
mechanics suggested a few decades ago by Einstein and others.
However, there is no difficulty in extending his definition of
matter to the composition of the universe as both an energy field
and an infinite aggregate of particles as demonstrated by the
alternative theories of light by Newton and Huygens, also by the
ancient theories of atomism first suggested by Democritus as
compared to the infinite physical extension featured by Aristotle
and Melissus. For if the basic “stuff” of the universe consists of a
multitude of particles comprising an energy field, Meslier’s
definition seems entirely defensible even today.
Meslier did take into account Democritus’ notion of atoms
that had been revived for modern use a few decades earlier by
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Gassendi, “that matter exists and can be divided into an infinite
number of parts that you can, if you want, call atoms; and it is sure
that the parts of matter actually move.” Two paragraphs later,
Meslier added, “So, it is much more appropriate to attribute to
matter itself the force that it has to move than to vainly and
needlessly be burdened with so many insurmountable difficulties
searching outside it for a false principle of its movement.”18 In
other words, nature’s extraordinary harmony is entirely the
product of natural laws arranged and modified by determinate
physical control:
Natural reason proves that everything that is most beautiful,
most perfect, and most wonderful in nature can be made by
the natural laws of movement alone and by the different
configurations of the parts of matter variously arranged,
united, and modified or combined in all kinds of beings that
make what we call the world.19
Without exception, all these presumed miracles derive from the
“moving force of matter alone” rather than anthropomorphic
intelligence, and this materialist force necessarily involves chance
and fortune rather than divine intelligence:
To say that all these things are conducted in their
movements and in the production of their effects by a
supreme intelligence is a pure illusion and a pure fiction of
the human mind and is not based on any true reason, since
we clearly see that all this can be done naturally by the
moving force of matter alone, which moves itself and acts
blindly everywhere without knowing what it is doing or
why it is doing it.20
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In a later chapter Meslier once again featured the connection
between nature’s beauty and the dynamics between mass and
force in nature:
It is also clear and evident that all these different effects or
works that we see in Nature are made by the movement of
matter and by the different assemblies, unions, and
modifications of its parts. . . . And since this movement of
matter can only come from matter itself . . ., and since this
union and division of matter is only a natural result of its
movement and of the regular or irregular movement of its
parts, it follows that the formation itself of all these beautiful
and admirable works of nature does not at all demonstrate
or prove the existence of an infinitely perfect God.21
And just a page later:
Is it not possible that all this multitude of parts always
moves in this way without being mixed up and running into
one another, joining, binding, stopping, and attaching
together in many kinds of ways and so starting to compose
all these different works that we see in Nature, which could
then be perfected and strengthened by the continuation of
the same movements that started to produce them.22
Meslier went on to insist that water, fire, smoke, plants, animals,
and all productions of nature can be explained on this basis-pretty much as Bacon had suggested a century earlier.
Meslier also seems to have anticipated the link between
atomism and the issue of force—now described as energy—by
means of an explanation that anticipated future investigation of
sub-atomic behavior.23 He rejected the “first mover” suppositions
of creationists as “false principles,” though of course today’s Big
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Bang theory more or less seems to confirm these suppositions. He
did concede that God could have performed an event comparable
to the “big bang” in order to set the stage for the entire process
that has followed at all levels of existence. Then again, he argued
that it seemed more likely this occurrence took place without the
involvement of any kind of God.
As earlier suggested, Meslier’s analysis can be further
expanded based on the likelihood that countless universes do exist
in a more inclusive plenum, all of which first manifest themselves
through the inception of big bangs dominated by force (or energy)
and much later culminate as black holes of concentrated matter a
hundred billion years later, give or take a few thousand. Relative
to the cosmos in its entirety, each universe is little more than an
enormous surge of energy that consolidates, then turns to ash in a
vast realm of other such flashes that rise and fall in a comparable
manner. Here the anthropomorphic god-concept becomes, if
anything a personification too miniscule to explain the vast cosmic
dynamics that occur on what might seem an inconceivable scale.
By emphasizing the authority of a God both perfect and allpowerful as explained by Meslier, creationists effectively accept
the paradox that God is morally unassailable despite anything that
“goes wrong” in light of His limitless authority. Perhaps resulting
from France’s social crisis at the turn of the eighteenth century,
Meslier insisted that a truly virtuous all-powerful God could not
have permitted society and its institutions to have declined to such
an extent-Now, it is evident that the world is almost completely
filled up with evils and miseries. The men here are all full of
vices, errors, and viciousness; their governments are full of
injustices and tyrannies. We see a torrent of vices and
viciousness; discord and division reign almost everywhere.
17

The just and innocent are oppressed and groan almost
everywhere; the poor are almost everywhere in death and
suffering, without support and consolation.
On the other hand, we often see the vicious, impious
and those most unworthy of living, nevertheless enjoy
prosperity, delight and honors, and an abundance of all
kinds of goods. . .. So it is evident that the world is almost
everywhere filled up with nothing but evils, miseries, vices,
viciousness, cheating, injustice, robbery, larceny, cruelty,
tyranny, imposture, lies, discord, and confusion, it is a
certain and evident proof that there is no infinitely good and
wise being who is capable of bringing suitable relief and,
consequently, there is no all-powerful being who is infinitely
good and wise, as our Christ-cultists claim.24
In Meslier’s opinion the contradiction as described here is thus
unsustainable, demonstrating the non-existence of God beyond
Descartes’ concept of a “malicious demon,” not that Meslier
seriously took into account this particular vision of supernatural
authority:
By wanting to make [God] perfect and . . . to make him seem
grand, admirable, and incomprehensible in all things and in
all ways, they destroy him. And by wanting to strip him
and relieve him of all imperfections and all real and
imaginable qualities, they annihilate him and truly reduce
him to nothing. Why do they not just honestly recognize
and simply admit that he is nothing and does not exist,
seeing that he really is nothing and really does not exist?25
Paradoxically, Meslier suggested, god cultists end up proving
nothing in their effort to explain everything. They actually engage
in a collective delusion that Meslier described as shared psychosis:
18

“Believing that they become wiser in spiritualizing their God so
finely, they become more insane than they were,” since “their socalled sovereign beatitude consisted only in an imaginary
happiness and bliss and not in a real and true happiness and
beatitude.”26 Moreover, Meslier insisted, Christ-cultists try to
explain away the multitude of “vices and viciousness in both men
and beasts by emphasizing God’s status as an infinitely perfect
being that permits evil to exist in order to obtain spiritual
perfection. If a generous and loving God actually exists, Meslier
suggested, “Would it not be a far greater good and far more
worthy of the glory, honor, and pleasure of an all-powerful,
infinitely perfect God to make all his creatures completely happy
and perfect?” But of course such a God does not exist, so an
elaborate lie becomes necessary to describe the role of a perfect
God in charge of an imperfect universe.27
According to Meslier, Christ-cultists and most other godcultists primarily advocate the delusion of God’s supposed power
to rectify Nature’s blatant disparities by rewarding its victims with
eternal joy and punishing their persecutors with eternal
punishment in hell--not to omit the possibility of a third realm,
Purgatory, as a preliminary zone of punishment less horrific than
hellfire. All three of these transcendent zones supposedly exist in
an extraterrestrial domain totally inaccessible to mankind except
upon dying. Meslier thus rejected this almost universal belief in
an afterlife featured by most religions as “a kind of madness that
often enough approaches fanaticism.”28 Instead, he resorted to
essentially the same argument as the ancient natural historian
Pliny already proposed in the first century A.D.: “All men are in
the same state from their last day onward as they were before their
first day, and neither body nor mind possesses any sensation after
death, any more than it did before birth.”29 In Meslier’s words,
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[After death} we will all return to the state we were in before
we were born or before we existed, and just as at that time
we thought about nothing, imagined nothing, and were
nothing, so also after death we will think about nothing, feel
nothing, and imagine nothing any more.”30
Moreover, we are already “experts” in death, having been devoid
of life for countless centuries before they were born. After we die,
we can expect to return to exactly the same limbo from whence we
came, just as devoid of consciousness as before we were born.
Surprisingly, Meslier quoted Ecclesiastes to confirm his
assessment:
The dead know nothing and they wait for no reward; no
feelings of hatred or love or any desire at all affect them and
they take part no longer in all that is done in the world. Go,
then, in peace and joy to enjoy the goods that you have!
Drink and eat the fruits of your labor in peace and rejoice
with your friends and loved ones; for, that is all the good
you can hope for in life.31
In effect, live while you can, for when you’re dead you will be
truly lifeless--just as dead as all other creatures upon their life’s
cessation.
Meslier went on to ask how and why a God who puts so
much emphasis upon virtue and obedience in mankind cannot
“make itself sufficiently known to men. . . . For, if it makes itself
sufficiently known, no one would be ignorant of, deny, and doubt
its existence; and so, there would not be as many disputes as there
are among men about its so-called existence.”32 Why, in effect, did
God intentionally confuse people able to recognize all the
contradictions implicit in Christian belief when these were exactly
the people the most deserving of acceptance in heaven? Meslier
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complained, in fact, that, “ . . . there is not any divinity [among
modern societies] that makes itself or its intentions and will
sufficiently known to men.”33 The simple answer, Meslier
proposes, is the fact that such a God simply does not exist.
In his fifth proof Meslier actually went so far as to ridicule
Christ as an ignorant impostor, “a nobody who had no talent, no
mind, no learning, no skill, and who was appropriately despised
in the world.” Moreover, he argued that those who believe in
Christ “ascribe divinity to a fool, a madman, a wretched fanatic,
and a miserable scoundrel.”34 Meslier instead praised the accuracy
of contemporaries who described Christ as having been possessed
by a demon.35 Moreover, he ridicules Christ’s pretension that he
himself was the one and only son of God destined to rule Jews
eternally.36 If the god-concept was totally misguided because
there is no God—His identity has always been entirely mythical,
and it could only have been hopelessly delusional in predicting,
for example, that his disciples could observe him “coming down
from the sky with his angels, full of glory and power, with the
majesty to judge [i.e. to govern].”37 No less delusional, Meslier
added, was Christ’s promise to his disciples that they would soon
join him by “sit [ting] on a dozen thrones to judge” and that all
those who abandoned their families to follow him would thereby
achieve eternal life--in other words go to heaven.38 Surprisingly,
Meslier neglected to mention Christ’s prediction of Judgment Day
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when he would actually sit at the side of God in the task of
consigning almost the entirety of mankind to eternal hellfire. Also
relevant, Meslier suggested, was Christ’s assertion, “I am the way:
I am truth and I am life; no one comes to the Father except by
me.”40 Here Christ declared in effect that access to heaven was
only possible through belief in his unique role as the Son of God.
On Judgment Day all individuals unable to accept Christ’s unique
holy status would be consigned to hell by God, a fate that would
supposedly occur within a single lifetime of Christ’s warning.
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Again, Meslier insisted, if the god-concept was defunct, all of this
prophetic wisdom could also be discounted.
In his eighth and final proof, Meslier challenged the concept
of the soul. According to orthodox believers, the relationship
between physical anatomy and the incorporeal soul necessarily
converges in the human mind, effectively confirming the belief in
God’s final authority in spiritual matters. Needless to say, Meslier
vigorously rejected this rationale, especially as articulated by
Descartes and Malebranche, both of whom refused to accept the
secular definition “that matter is capable of thinking, willing,
feeling, desiring and loving, or hating, etc.” on the assumption
that all these mental functions transcend the physical dimensions
of length, width, and depth.41 In Meslier’s opinion, the key
oversight of these and others identified as Cartesians was their
failure to recognize that “the modifications alone of matter
produce all our thoughts, knowledge, and sensations.”42 This
distinction enabled Meslier to extend the principle of
consciousness to animals as well as humanity:
. . . It is not in any measurable extension or in any external
shape of matter that the knowledge and sensations of men
and beasts consist, but in the various internal movement,
agitations, and modifications that matter has in men and
beasts.43
Meslier also extended this principle to all processes of thought,
specifically listing desire, love, hate, joy, sadness, pleasure, pain,
fear, and hope, and he proposed that this mental capacity is more
advanced in some than in others: “These modifications consist in
the faculty or facility that some living beings have to think and
reason; and this faculty or facility is greater, i.e., clearer and freer,
in some more than others.”44
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As explained by Meslier, the mind derives from “subtle,
restless matter,” and upon death it loses its capacity to sustain
these modifications. Meslier quotes Montaigne to the effect that
“all thoughts, judgments and alterations of our bodies . . . are
continual,” and explains more specifically, “that the soul is not a
spiritual, intelligent and sentient substance in itself and it is not a
substance different from matter.”45 Instead, it is entirely derivative
of matter but at a more intricate level:
What we call “our soul” can be nothing else but a portion of
the finest, subtlest, and most restless matter of our body,
which is mixed up and modified in a certain way with
another, cruder matter with which it composes an organic
body and by its constant restlessness gives it life, movement,
and sentiment.46
And exactly so. For it turns out that Meslier’s words “agitation”
and “modifications of matter” far better describe the biological
activity that takes place with the occurrence of thought than the
less functional dynamics of spiritual transcendence. If brain cells
can be identified as “matter,” and if the interaction among these
material brain cells can be identified as an intricate process of
neural “modification,” then Meslier’s materialist definition of
mind (hence soul) is far more relevant to thought than the Platonic
notion of spiritual transcendence.
What neither Descartes nor Meslier knew was the simple
truth now taken for granted that the brain is very much a part of
the body and that it functions based on an intricate interplay of
electricity in transmission, in effect little more than an intricate
neural process ultimately linked with magnetism. At the time,
nobody had any idea of electricity’s essential role in mental
behavior dependent on the human brain, roughly three pounds in
weight, containing at least 15 to 33 billion neurons with up to
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10,000 synaptic connections apiece all of which are more or less
interconnected by a sufficient flow of electricity. For in fact
numerous studies indicate the human brain includes as many as
two hundred billion brain cells called neurons, each of which
possesses countless dendritic spines that serve as filaments linked
with other brain cells. Whatever the number, each of these brain
cells transmit messages to others by means of an electrical circuit
rendered possible by the metabolic interaction between oxygen
and glycogen, both of which are delivered to the brain by means
of blood carried by the arteries. As all students in freshman
college physiology learn (myself included), neural interaction
occurs and thinking becomes possible as long as blood delivers
oxygen and glycogen to the brain. Once this delivery ceases, for
example resulting from a stroke or heart attack, the mind
terminates, often just about as quickly as a TV screen goes dark
when it is turned off.
Afferent nerves deliver to the brain all the sense organ data
needed to think and make choices and efferent nerves deliver the
appropriate messages to the limbs that can do what is needed.
This applies to walking, eating, and throwing stones, but also to
emoting and thinking abstract thoughts. All consciousness is
mental behavior effectively steered by the brain, even for creatures
as primitive as worms and bedbugs, whose neural apparatus
functions at a far more simple level. Granted many exceptions, the
complexity of thought is more or less proportional to the number
of brain cells brought into play on this basis. People might be
better and more effectively endowed than other creatures, but this
is entirely a matter of degree, and in all instances the brain’s
function is strictly connected with that of the body. For brain cells
are necessarily comparable to other body cells in their structure
and performance dependent on glycogen and oxygen. So, yes,
Meslier’s abstractions anticipated modern scientific findings with
remarkable accuracy. Today, any scientific grant proposal to
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measure the soul’s ineffable manifestation in its departure from
the human body once death occurs would be ruinous to the
reputation of whoever ventures to submit such a proposal.
Meslier fully conceded human fallibility as the best and most
defensible excuse for religion. In the simplest possible words he
summed up the paradox of human nature with almost universal
relevance, “People need to be ignorant of many truths and believe
in many falsehoods.47 So exactly what kind of an ethics did he
propose to bridge the inevitable gap between believers and nonbelievers? One suspects he was willing to tolerate the freedom of
compulsive believers to confirm their dependence on religion, but
not at the expense of non-believers who reject the gratification
provided by obvious misinformation. Honesty and human
decency remained the most important traits to be cultivated in
Meslier’s opinion—more or less as featured by Aristotle in his
Nicomachean Ethics. As the best and most appropriate human
behavior instead of religion, Meslier accordingly in chap. 96, more
or less his book’s conclusion,
You will be happy if you follow the rules, maxims, and
precepts of this only wise and true religion. But I dare say,
although I am not prophet, that you and your descendants
will always be miserable and unhappy as long as you follow
any other religion than this. You and your descendants will
always be miserable and unhappy as long as you suffer the
domination of tyrants and the errors, abuses, and vain
superstitions of the cult of the gods and their idols.48
As Meslier fully expected, religion and patriotism have continued
to thrive over the following centuries among the world’s populace
at large. Nevertheless, the possibility of human improvement does
seem possible among the populace able and willing to enhance
their circumstances on a truly objective basis. It was Meslier’s
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unique achievement that his manuscript released upon his suicide
set the stage for a substantial breakthrough in secular idealism
first in France during the Enlightenment, later elsewhere across
the world.
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